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1OUTWARD INVESTMENT FROM THE NETHERLANDS:
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW1
Roger van Hoesel and Rajneesh Narula
Forthcoming in, [R. van Hoesel and R.Narula (eds)] ‘Multinationals from the
Netherlands’, London: Routledge, 1998
INTRODUCTION
Since the days of the Dutch East India company the economy of the Netherlands has
been heavily dependent on overseas activities of its firms. Despite the end of the colonial era,
the Netherlands has continued to be a significant player in the world economy, unlike similar
historically dominant trading nations such as Portugal and Spain. Business overseas is not just
restricted to trading activities but is also carried out through foreign direct investment (FDI)
by its multinational enterprises (MNEs) and, more recently, through strategic alliances and
networks. Indeed, the Netherlands is home to some of the world’s largest multinationals. As
will be illustrated in this chapter, even on an absolute basis, the Netherlands is the sixth
largest outward investor in the world. Despite the long history of international economic
activity and the dominant role of Dutch MNEs in the world economy, relatively little
                                                
1. We would like to thank Annelies Hogenbirk and Astrid Kusters of the University of Maastricht
for their research assistance in preparing this chapter. We would also like to thank Prof. Dr. van
Nieuwkerk of the Nederlandsche Bank for providing us with some of the data used here.
2academic research has been undertaken towards systematically evaluating these phenomena2.
This volume attempts to fill this gap.
                                                
2. The most notable exception is a study carried out by van Nieuwkerk and Sparling (1985)
more than a decade ago.
In this introductory chapter, we will illustrate the rather unique position the
Netherlands has as a home country of outward investment and touch upon some of the
insights into this phenomenon as presented in the other chapters of the volume. To this end,
first some characteristics of the Dutch economy will be compared with those of other major
outward investors. Subsequently, the overall position of the Netherlands as an outward
investor in comparison with other countries will be discussed. Next, the regional and sectoral
shifts in FDI that have taken place over time will be examined. In the final section, a profile
of the most important Dutch MNEs will be drawn.
STRUCTURE OF THE DUTCH ECONOMY: SOME CHARACTERISTICS
Although many characteristics of the Netherlands will be analysed in more detail in
other chapters of this book, in this section we will briefly address a number of features of the
Dutch economy which have shaped the outward investment pattern of the country. In Table
1.1, some basic indicators of the Netherlands and a number of other major outward investors
are depicted. From the Table, some interesting observations can be made. First of all, the
figures illustrate that -in comparison with most other home countries of MNEs- the
Netherlands is a small country, both in terms of its population and the size of its economy. In
fact, only Switzerland is smaller. As can be derived from Table 1.1, in terms of the welfare
level the Netherlands is not exceptional; only Switzerland and the US show considerably
higher per capita GDPs (measured in terms of purchasing power parity).
****TABLE 1.1 ABOUT HERE****
3Regarding the sectoral composition of the economies, we note that in the case of the
Netherlands the primary sector (especially agriculture and natural gas) contributes somewhat
more to the country’s GDP than in the other countries. Furthermore, the services sector
generates a relatively large number of jobs (some 73%) as compared with most of the other
countries listed.
Most striking, however, is the extraordinary importance of international trade
activities for the Dutch economy. Although it is quite common for smaller economies to
depend more heavily on overseas business activities than their larger counterparts, the ratios
of exports as well as imports to GDP are extremely high - also in comparison with
Switzerland. Part of the explanation is the special function the Netherlands has as a major
distribution centre for continental Europe. Although many Dutch companies do indeed have
their most important markets abroad, a substantial share of the trade figures do not reflect the
production of final goods in the Netherlands but ‘merely’ reflects the re-export and transit of
goods produced elsewhere (OECD, 1996). However, this observation does not diminish the
strong outward orientation of the country.
Table 1.2 renders a view on the relative economic performance of the Dutch economy
over time. In the Table, the Netherlands is compared with Northwest European countries
(which, broadly speaking, share similar economic characteristics), the European Union (EU),
and the OECD as a whole. In terms of real GDP per capita the Table shows that for the whole
period (1960-1994), the growth for the Netherlands was somewhat lower than that in other
Northwest European countries and considerably lower than in the EU and the OECD. Given
the lower welfare base from which the more recent (South European) EU and OECD member
states commenced, the latter is no surprise. Especially during the period 1960-1987 the
performance of the Dutch economy was relatively poor. In more recent years, the economy
performed much better and even surpassed the performance of countries mentioned in the
other categories in the Table. In 1994, the per capita GDP level in the Netherlands was only 4
percentage points lower than in the other Northwest European economies implying a
substantial improvement from the previous period. Given the relatively high growth figures
that are being realised at present, the position of the Netherlands is expected to equal or even
surpass that of quite a number of other economies in the region. The welfare level vis-à-vis
the EU and the OECD as a whole was considerably higher.
4****TABLE 1.2 ABOUT HERE****
In terms of the growth of labour productivity, the picture looks different. Table 1.2
reveals that until 1987, the growth of labour productivity in the Netherlands was quite high;
since then, it has considerably dropped behind that of other Northwest European countries,
the EU as well as the OECD. Notwithstanding this relatively low growth since the late 1980s,
labour productivity is still at a very high level and clearly exceeds productivity in other
economies.
Van Essen and Verspagen discuss the technology characteristics of the Dutch
economy in Chapter 3. The authors show that total R&D efforts in the Netherlands have been
relatively modest as compared to other leading countries but are rather similar to those of
other small countries such as Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, and Denmark. It turns out that,
whereas the public R&D efforts are well developed, business R&D in the Netherlands is
carried out at a relatively small scale and low intensity. According to van Essen and
Verspagen, this - inter alia - can be attributed to the very specific structure of Dutch business,
with much of Dutch R&D activities being concentrated in five large MNEs. As Cantwell and
Janne show in Chapter 4, Dutch MNEs carry out a relatively large share of their R&D
activities abroad. Given the limited size of the Dutch economy, only a limited range of
technological sectors are covered in enough detail. The transplantation of R&D activities to
other countries is thus not fully compensated by the activities of foreign companies in the
Netherlands. Another explanation for the limited business R&D activities in the Netherlands
proposed by van Essen and Verspagen is the relatively large role of small business in the
Dutch economy. The authors also argue that the sectoral structure (with a large share of the
services sector) of the Netherlands also partly explain the modest R&D performance.
Cantwell and Janne in Chapter 4 examine the internationalisation of R&D activities of
Dutch MNEs in comparison with their leading European competitors. Although the gap has
closed somewhat since the 1980s, they show that the largest Dutch industrial MNEs are still
among the most internationalised in terms of their research activities. The authors argue that
the large MNEs have successfully combined the resources available to several geographically
dispersed units. Interestingly, firms tend not only to build on fields of strengths they had
already established at home, but also broaden their technological capabilities over time by
5taking advantage of local sources of expertise and innovation in each site. Cantwell and Janne
illustrate that mergers & acquisitions have played an important role in this respect.
****TABLE 1.3 ABOUT HERE****
In view of its importance to the Dutch economy, a final remark in this concise
introduction to the Dutch economy concerns the destination and composition of exports. In
Table 1.3 the geographical destination of Dutch exports is listed, whereas the share of the
various product groups over time is shown in Table 1.4. Table 1.3 clearly illustrates that
Europe has remained by far the most important destination of Dutch exports. Although the
share of the EU and EFTA has gone down somewhat, in 1994 still a great majority of Dutch
products remained on the European continent. The Table also illustrates that the importance
of the USA as an export destination has remained rather low during the last two decades and
is even more modest than Dutch exports to Asia. Finally, we observe than in recent years the
geographical destination of Dutch exports has become somewhat more diversified although
an important part of the new target markets is located in Eastern Europe.
****TABLE 1.4 ABOUT HERE****
What are these exports composed of? Table 1.4 shows that a large majority of Dutch exports
consists of manufactures. The most important product groups are metal manufactures
(including electronics), chemicals, and food, beverages and tobacco. Interesting to note in this
respect in that, although some fluctuations did take place, grosso modo the relative
importance of the goods exported from the Netherlands has not changed much during the last
two decades. This implies that also the relative knowledge extensive industries -such as food,
beverages and tobacco and textiles- have continued to play an important role for the Dutch
economy3.
                                                
3. We would like to emphasise, however, that one has to be cautious in labelling industries as
‘knowledge (or R&D) intensive or extensive’. Not only can important variations exist within
these (broad) sectors, but also important technological advances have been observed in
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traditionally non-R&D intensive sectors.
In Chapter 2, de Goey describes how, since the 17th century, Dutch companies built
up a world-wide presence. Important pioneers were the Dutch East India company (VOC) and
the Dutch West Indies company (WIC) which in the 17th and 18th century created trading
settlements in a large number of countries. These trading activities generated enormous
wealth, making the Netherlands one of the most prosperous countries in the world. When the
opportunities to invest at home became saturated in the second half of the 18th century, the
capital flowing abroad really gained momentum. As de Goey points out, this capital was
utilised for a wide variety of purposes, ranging from the provision of loans to the US
government to support their independence war, to the exploitation of plantations in Surinam.
After a serious recession in the first half of the 19th century, the Netherlands re-emerged as
one of the leading capital exporters in the world, and has remained a net capital exporter ever
since.
Although cross-country capital exports have been registered for centuries, foreign
direct (as opposed to portfolio) investment only assumed substantial proportions in the
twentieth century. From the 1960s onwards, the size of global FDI grew substantially, but
especially in the decades that followed the overseas presence through direct investment went
up drastically. Whereas from the 1970s improved transportation facilities, innovations in
communication systems, and growing protectionism motivated companies to invest abroad
(Belderbos, 1989), since the 1980s globalisation tendencies and the emergence of new home
bases of MNEs accelerated the overseas presence of companies at an unprecedented pace. In
this section, the outward investment position of the Netherlands will be compared with that of
other home countries. In Table 1.5, a number of indicators are listed from which some
interesting observations can be drawn.
****TABLE 1.5 ABOUT HERE****
7First of all, the Table underlines the enormous growth of overseas presence of
companies through FDI in the world during the last two decades. Global outstanding
investment stock went up from US$ 280 billion in 1975 to US$ 2,238 billion in 1944 - an
almost tenfold increase. Notwithstanding the emergence of important new outward investors,
the Netherlands has to a large extent been able to maintain its relative position. Its share in
global FDI stock went down by only 1 percentage point from 7.1% in 1975 to 6.1% two
decades later. The peak of Dutch presence was recorded in 1980, when 8.2% of outstanding
FDI stock in the world originated in the Netherlands - making the country the fourth largest
investor in the world. At present, the Netherlands still occupies the sixth largest position. The
drop on the outward investor ladder can be largely ascribed to the emergence of Japan as a
major investor and -to a lesser extent- the increased overseas investment activities by
Germany, France and Italy. The substantial decrease of the share of the US in global FDI
stock has been particularly remarkable (from 44.3% in 1975 to 25.7% in 1994). This
illustrates an erosion of the technological, managerial, and commercial superiority the US
possessed in many industries vis-à-vis other parts of the world (Dunning 1993). In recent
years, the relative importance of Switzerland has gone down considerably, while that of Japan
8has grown4.
                                                
4. An important weakness of the stock figures usually published (which are also used here) is
that they are valued at their historical costs instead of present values. As a result, ‘older’
investments are seriously undervalued if compared with more recent projects. This also
implies that the total stock value of countries that registered early FDI in reality reflect a more
extensive overseas presence than that of more recent outward investors.  However, data
restrictions prevent re-evaluation of FDI to adjust for this. See Cantwell and Bellak (1994) for
further discussion on this issue, and an attempt at re-evaluation.
If we take the size of the countries into account, the position of the Netherlands is
even more remarkable. Just behind Switzerland, the Netherlands on a per capita basis has
invested most capital abroad (i.e. US$ 9,494 at the end of 1994), which is much more than the
other countries listed in the Table. The outward direct investment stock (FDI stock/GDP ratio
for the Netherlands is even the highest by far, suggesting that no other country undertakes
such a large part of its economic activities outside its own borders. A last indicator mentioned
in Table 1.5 is the FDI stock to export (FDI stock/EXP) ratio. Although FDI and export
certainly cannot be considered (perfect) substitutes (cf. Narula, 1996), it does render an
indication of the relative importance of these modes of international business. Interestingly,
the position of the Netherlands in this respect is much less extraordinary. In 1994, for
instance, the UK, Switzerland and the US all showed higher FDI stock/EXP ratios. Although,
9this can partly be explained by the prominent position exporting takes in the Dutch economy,
as we have we noted already, part of these trading activities reflect the re-export and transit of
goods that are not produced in the Netherlands. If we take this phenomenon into account, the
FDI stock/EXP ratio for the Netherlands probably would go up considerably.
GEOGRAPHICAL AND SECTORAL TRENDS
In this section, the trends in overseas investment originating in the Netherlands are
examined more carefully. First, the geographical destination of Dutch FDI will be examined.
Subsequently, the sectors in which companies invested are analysed. In Tables 1.6 and 1.7 the
geographical and sectoral breakdown of FDI stock respectively are listed for a number of
years5.
Geographical trends
                                                
5. 1973 is the first year for which these data were published.
Unfortunately, until very recently only a small number of host countries of Dutch
MNEs were specified in the statistics published by the Dutch Central Bank (‘De
Nederlandsche Bank’). Nonetheless, a picture can be drawn of the importance of the various
regions where Dutch companies are active through FDI as well as the trends which have
occurred during the last two decades. First, Table 1.6 illustrates that a great majority of Dutch
FDI has gone to the European Union and the United States. In fact, the relative importance of
the EU and US taken together has even increased from 64.6% in 1973 to 73.9% in 1995.
Between 1973 and 1995 the stock of Dutch FDI in the European Union went up about six
times from some fl 22 billion to more than fl 139 billion. The share of the EU as a destination
for Dutch MNE activity has declined somewhat in this period, but still accounts for almost
half of all outstanding investments (i.e. 49.2% at the end of 1995). The present share is
substantially higher than ten years ago when ‘only’ 32.8% had gone to other EU member
states. This temporary dip in popularity of the home region coincided with an increased
10
interest in investing in the US. The EU 1992 Treaty again boosted investment in the EU
resulting in a higher share in total Dutch FDI. New market potentials and the need to
restructure existing production operations in Europe resulted in a strong upswing of FDI.
The Table further shows substantial fluctuations in the relative importance of the EU
members as host countries for MNEs from the Netherlands. The share of Belgium and
Luxembourg, for instance, went up from 7.1% of total global Dutch FDI stock in 1973 to
13.3% in 1995 whereas the relative importance of Germany went down from 18.8% to 7.8%
in the same period. Another important host country is the United Kingdom, whose share
varied considerably during the last two decades. An important determinant in the case of
Dutch FDI in the UK concerns the activities of several Anglo Dutch conglomerates such as
Shell, Unilever, and Reed-Elsevier. Next to the EU countries, Switzerland has emerged as an
important target country in Europe having absorbed 6.7% of outstanding Dutch FDI at the end
of 1995. Although Central and Eastern Europe in recent years have attracted the attention of
Dutch MNEs, their relative importance as a host region is still relatively modest accounting
for a scant 1.0% of total outstanding FDI.
****TABLE 1.6 ABOUT HERE****
Outside Europe, the US has always been by far the most important target region6. In
the period concerned, FDI stock in the US went up from fl 6.2 billion to fl 69.8 billion
implying a more than tenfold increase. Narula and Hogenbirk explored the trends in Dutch
investment in the US at length in Chapter 8. The authors show, inter alia,  that at one point in
time in the 1980s, Dutch MNEs accounted for no less than one-quarter of all FDI stock in the
US. It appears that such factors as the large homogenous market, advanced technological
environment, political stability, and societal and economic freedom have been important pull
factors that stimulated Dutch companies to invest in the US (van Nieuwkerk and Sparling,
1985). The increasing saturation of the traditional European markets combined with the
relatively imperfect functioning of these markets in the 1980s led to a pull away from Europe
                                                
6. In Chapter 2, de Goey shows that Dutch investors have historically been very active in the
US.
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towards the US. As Narula and Hogenbirk point out, the competitiveness of Dutch firms in
that period was superior to that of their European rivals. Since then, however, the share in US
manufacturing has gone down, suggesting a decline in the competitive strengths vis-à-vis
other countries. In addition, the further unification of the EU in 1992 and the emergence of
new major investors such as Japan, has led to an increased emphasis on investments in
European countries. Moreover, the changing structure of the Dutch economy in favour of the
services sector and at the expense of the manufacturing sector has caused as drop in
manufacturing FDI. Nevertheless, at the end of 1995, the US had still attracted about one-
quarter of outstanding Dutch FDI.
In Chapter 9, Belderbos discusses the activities of Dutch MNEs in Japan. Analysing
aggregate as well as micro level data, the author argues that the operations of Dutch
companies in Japan reflect regulatory and economic conditions that have affected inward FDI
in Japan at large. Until very recently, locational disadvantages and a range of entry barriers
kept inward investment growing at a very low rate. What remains striking, however, is the
near absence of many of the most internationalised Dutch MNEs in Japan, which have
otherwise been very active in Europe and the US. It is also worth noting that Dutch
subsidiaries in Japan export more from Japan than they import. Philips, for instance, uses its
Japanese manufacturing base to establish and improve linkages with the strong local supply
base and locally available R&D infrastructure.
With regard to the developing (non-OECD) countries, Table 1.6 shows that the picture
has changed considerably over time. Important variations can be observed between the
various developing regions. Although its share has dropped (from 11.9% in 1973 to 6.5% in
1995), Latin America and the Caribbean is the most important host region for Dutch MNEs
outside the OECD area. However, at the same time we note that almost half of these
investments have flown to the Netherlands Antilles where shell companies are primarily set
up to make use of favourable tax regulations. If FDI in the Netherlands Antilles are excluded,
developing Asia is the most important non-OECD host region. The share of Dutch FDI stock
that has gone to Asian countries has gone up from 3.9% in 1973 to 4.9% in 1995. 1994
figures suggest that within this region, Hong Kong is by far the most important destination of
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Dutch MNEs accounting for 3.6% of total FDI stock7. The interest in Hong Kong stems not
only from attractive locational advantages of the city state itself. Quite a number of
companies also use Hong Kong as a base to conduct business in the People’s Republic of
China (see Harold and Lall 1994). Other relatively important destinations in Asia are
Singapore (1.0% in 1994) and Taiwan (0.6% in 1994). This brings us to our next observation,
namely that outside the OECD area, Dutch MNEs have primarily focussed on higher income
developing countries. As was also observed by van Nieuwkerk and Sparling (1985), this
preference for the more advanced host economies appears to have been in place for a longer
time. In view of this preference, it is no surprise that the share of Dutch FDI going to Africa is
only very small and that the actual amount invested in the continent since 1985 has even gone
down8.
Sectoral trends
In Table 1.7, a sectoral breakdown of Dutch FDI stock for a number of years is given.
Some remarkable trends emerge from the Table. The most striking change during the period
1973-1995 is the tremendously increased importance of FDI in the tertiary sector. Its share in
total Dutch FDI stock went up from 13.2% in 1973 to 49.0% in 1995. This coincided with a
decreasing share for the industrial sector which went down from 86.5% to 50.9%. Yet, the
total amount invested in industrial activities grew in this period from fl 38.2 billion to fl 143.9
billion.
****TABLE 1.7 ABOUT HERE****
                                                
7. For 1995, such detailed figures were not yet available.
8. In the 1980s oil exploitation had resulted in Dutch investments of some importance.
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Within the industrial sector, chemicals, coal,  and petroleum are the most important
targets. Their relative importance has dropped considerably over the years, however. Whereas
(taking these industries together) at the end of 1973 no less than 47.4% of total Dutch
overseas investment originated in this sector, this share had gone down 26.5% at the end of
1994. Another important source of outward FDI is food, beverages and tobacco from which
9.6% of outstanding FDI at the end of 1995 had originated. Furthermore, as is shown in Table
1.7, metal products (including electronics) has contributed considerably to Dutch overseas
production activities. However, the shares of these sectors have also gone down substantially
during the last two decades. As will be illustrated in the next section, the sectors just
mentioned are precisely those in which the 5 largest industrial Dutch MNEs (Shell, Akzo-
Nobel, DSM: chemicals and oil; Unilever: food and beverages; and Philips: electronics) are
active9.
                                                
9. According to van Nieuwkerk and Sparling (1985), nearly three-quarters of the Dutch
investment position abroad is accounted for by the ten largest MNEs.
As we noted earlier, Dutch FDI in the services sector has witnessed astonishing
growth. Although no fundamental differences exist between services and production-related
MNEs regarding the way in which they decide to establish local subsidiaries abroad, Stibora
and de Vaal in Chapter 5 point out that a major distinction is that primary and secondary
goods can in principle always be sold through exports. In the case of services activities, there
is often no choice: their output has to be sold abroad through a physical presence. As was
pointed out earlier the service sector plays a very important role in the Dutch economy - even
when compared to other economically advanced countries. Their dominance is not confined
to the domestic economy, however. Also internationally, the services sector has become very
substantial. Stibora and de Vaal illustrate that the Netherlands has acquired a relative
comparative advantage in almost all subsectors of the services sector. In the non-services
sector, on the other hand, such strong position is observed in far fewer subsectors. In view of
the fact that this pattern deviates considerably from most other OECD countries, the authors
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conclude that the Netherlands over time has increasingly specialised in services, especially in
banking and insurance. FDI stock in the services sector went up from fl 5.8 billion at the end
of 1973 to fl 138.5 billion in 1995, implying an increase of more than 20 times! Table 1.7
illustrates that finance, insurance and business services (36.2% of total Dutch FDI stock) and
wholesale and retail trade (10.5%) are by far the most important sources.
GENERAL TRENDS IN DUTCH MNE ACTIVITY
It is not surprising, given the significance of trade and outward FDI activity to the
Dutch economy, that the Netherlands is home to a large number of MNEs. Table 1.8 gives the
latest available data on outward FDI stock by country and sector for 1995. This illustrates
well the extent of the activities of Dutch firms overseas, in terms of both scale and scope. In
this section, we examine the firm-level changes and developments that underlie the macro
data. In addition to their sheer size in terms of dominance of outward FDI stocks, Dutch
MNEs are also generally considered as competitive on a global scale, not just in terms of
price and quality, but are also amongst the most technology-intensive in their respective
sectors. These facts are axiomatic, and are considered a general feature of small open
economies (see for example, Freeman and Lundvall [eds] 1988, Dunning and Narula 1996
and the discussion by van Tulder in chapter 10 of this book). This body of literature has
illustrated that small open economies tend to be more internationalised, with a relatively large
share of the value-added activity being conducted with the explicit purpose of serving
overseas markets. Furthermore, firms from these countries tend to be competitive in a few
niche sectors, as small countries tend to have limited resources and prefer to engage in
activities in a few targeted sectors, rather than spreading these resources thinly across several
industries.
****TABLE 1.8 ABOUT HERE****
Nonetheless, Dutch MNEs (along with those from Switzerland), while displaying
these general traits, are also something of an outlier, demonstrating a pre-eminence amongst
small open economies. The Netherlands acts as a ‘large’ small country, not only in terms of
the scale, but also in terms of the industrial scope of the activities of its firms. Dutch firms 
15
form two distinct types. First, there are those in a large number of sectors behaving in a ‘small
country’ way, where production is atomistic: a large number of small and medium size firms,
primarily focussed on supplying large firms locally or exporting to foreign owned
establishments overseas, and that tend to be in a few very focussed industrial sectors. The
second group are the large conglomerates with interests in several -often disparate - sectors,
the names of whom are familiar to everyone, and tend to be market leaders in the industries in
which they operate, not just in the Netherlands, but on a worldwide basis. The first group is
unspectacular - every country, small or large, has such firms. The second group, on the other
hand, is unusual by any standards. Table 1.9 lists a number of Fortune 500 firms in 1995, by
parentage for some of the smaller industrialised economies worldwide. With the exception of
Swiss MNEs, Dutch firms are significantly larger, and are engaged in a wider range of
industries than firms from other countries. The 10 largest companies accounted for an
unwieldy 78% of total market capitalisation in the Netherlands at the end of 1993. Of these
10, three firms: Royal Dutch/Shell, Unilever and the ING group, accounted for over 50%10.
*****Table 1.9 about here****
                                                
10. Euromoney, pp. 348-352, September 1994.
As several of the chapters in this book illustrate, the activities of Dutch firms has
undergone considerable change since the early 1980s. Although these changes have affected
firms from different sectors to varying extents, there are nonetheless some interesting general
trends that can be said to be near-universal. First, there has been a rationalisation of activities
in order to cope with the establishment of the single market within the European Union. This
is both a defensive and an offensive strategy, because similar rationalisation has been
occurring across most European countries, as firms prepare for more cross-border competition
where activities hitherto were more or less confined to national boundaries. Firms from
countries with small home country markets such as the Netherlands have tended not to have
the economies of scale to compete with firms from the larger European countries, particularly
so in the financial service sectors, such as banking and insurance. Dutch MNEs, in a pattern
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that seems to have duplicated itself across most European firms, have engaged in a
rationalisation of their European operations partly in an attempt to conform to (and to take
advantage of) the gradual implementation of the directives leading to the single market in the
1980s, particularly in manufacturing. Similar adjustment did not occur in the banking and
services sector till the 1990s, however, as the agreement on a single currency was not begun
in earnest until early in this decade. Second, there has been a liberalisation of markets on a
global scale as sectors such as insurance, real estate, retailing, and utilities have seen a
reduction in restrictions on FDI, particularly as a result of the completion of the Uruguay
round. Third, these two factors have led to a liberalisation of the domestic market in the
Netherlands, that has seen the growing presence of foreign firms, which have been chipping
away at a previously relatively captive market. Fourth, the slowing down of economic growth
in most of the industrialised countries has meant that firms have increasingly had to seek new
markets outside their traditional markets. In the case of Dutch MNEs, this has meant reducing
the emphasis on Western Europe, and seeking or expanding their presence, particularly in
Asia, but also in Latin America and Eastern Europe. Fifth, in the manufacturing sector, the
reduction in trade barriers and the continuing high cost of production in Europe, has led to a
rationalisation and relocation of production to low-wage regions, which, not coincidentally
are also fast growing markets for some of these products.  The next section examines some of
the changes that have occurred amongst specific MNEs in several of the more important
sectors.
A PROFILE OF DUTCH MNES
Manufacturing sector
The international activities of Dutch manufacturing MNEs are very much dominated
by four large firms - Unilever, Royal Dutch Shell, Philips, and Akzo-Nobel. As Table 1.10
shows, these four firms dominate most economic statistics, together accounting for almost
50% of the sales of the 100 largest firms in the Netherlands. Indeed, according to UNCTAD
(1996), Unilever, Shell, and Philips are the ninth, tenth, and 27th most internationalised MNEs
in the world, and in absolute terms, Unilever and Philips have the two largest number of
overseas employees of any firm in the world, together employing about half a million people
17
overseas.
****Table 1.10 about here****
The cases of Unilever and Shell, both Anglo-Dutch conglomerates, provide a very
rosy picture of the state of MNEs from the Netherlands. Shell has consistently been the most
profitable, or one of the most profitable companies in the world for several years, which is
attributed to its ability to spread its risk and ride through slowdowns and recessions in
different parts of the world by being geographically diversified11. Shell manages operations in
120 countries. It has also been trimming its operations - in particular this has meant a
reduction in its US operations, where it has been gradually reducing its involvement (see
Chapter 8), while making relatively risky (but potentially hugely profitable) investments in
the former Soviet republics. However, Shell has also trimmed itself in terms of its industrial
diversity, focussing on a few core businesses, having sold or reduced its holdings in coal and
chemicals, with an eye on exiting other non-petroleum mining operations12. Unilever, which
along with arch-rivals Nestlé and Procter and Gamble, is increasingly locked in a competition
to dominate the global food and personal-care products industries. All three of these large
MNEs have been engaging in numerous take-overs, acquisitions, and disposals to achieve
rationalised, global positions, particularly given the relatively low margins in this industry. As
an example, in the first half of 1996, Unilever made 24 acquisitions and 15 disposals at a net
cost of almost fl 3 billion13. Chapter 7 discusses trends in Dutch MNE mergers and
acquisitions in some detail.
                                                
11. Fortune, pp. 71-75, August 5 1996.
12. Forbes, pp. 92-94, November 9 1992
13. Financial Times, p.10, August 10 1996
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The continuing struggle of Philips to adapt to the realities of increased global
competition and the volatility of the consumer electronics market, has continued to dominate
the forecasts for the Dutch manufacturing sector. The economic well-being of Philips tends to
dominate the landscape of Dutch outward FDI in manufacturing, and indeed the Dutch
manufacturing sector, directly employing over 260,000 people worldwide in 1995, and 44,000
in the Netherlands alone. In addition to refocusing their activities to a few core sectors, they
have cut costs to achieve the price competitiveness that US and Japanese firms have achieved
through similar attempts at re-focussing conducted through the early 1990s. The sale of its
controlling stake in Germany’s Grundig, and large lay-offs (particularly in the Netherlands),
as well as the decision to re-align their R&D towards more short-term and applied research
are just three ways in which Philips has tried to do so. It has also re-located production to
low-wage countries such as China where Philips had nine joint ventures as of late 1996. At
the same time, it has sought to enter new markets, by developing expertise in flat-screen
technology, a sector that has hitherto been dominated by Japanese firms. In particular, Philips
has established the only flat-screen manufacturing facility in Europe that is not Japanese
controlled, and in fact have been acquiring flat-panel manufacturing capacity in Japan
(Chapter 9). In addition, the merger of the telephone manufacturing operations of Philips and
Lucent technologies is expected to make it more competitive in the mobile communications
sector, since the joint venture will have revenues of US$ 2.5 billion and access to the
technological expertise of both companies14. These restructuring woes do not extend to
Polygram, which, although a subsidiary of Philips, has remained largely independent in its
operations, and continues to be one of the largest and most successful entertainment groups,
having gradually expanded their presence from music to television and films.
The case of Akzo-Nobel is another very good example of restructuring to face the
challenges of the new economic realities. Akzo (itself a product of the merger between
Algemene Kunstzijde Unie [AKU] and Koninklijke Zout Organon [KZO] in 1969),
successfully acquired Nobel industries of Sweden in 1994, to become the world’s largest
producer of paints and industrial coatings with revenues of fl 22 billion (Table 1.10), and
70,000 employees in 1996. At the same time it is actively restructuring itself by dismantling
its five division structure and replacing it with 34 business units clustered in four groups
                                                
14. Financial Times, p.29, June 18 1997
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based on their technical and commercial synergies15. It has also cut costs by deliberately
reducing its R&D expenditure to 20% less than its needs, forcing managers to seek external
sources for technology16. Furthermore, Akzo-Nobel has sought to focus its industrial
distribution, by undertaking either to sell its non-core holdings, or to partner with other firms.
The printing and publishing sector has also gone through a revitalisation, in this case
marked by a series of mergers. Elsevier merged with the UK publishing giant Reed in 1992 to
create yet another Anglo-Dutch conglomerate with sales of fl 9 billion and 25, 800 employees
in 1996. This marriage has been followed by a series of divestitures (e.g., the sale of IPC, the
UK-based newspapers and magazines division of Reed), and acquisitions (e.g, OAG
publications, Lexis-Nexis, MDL information systems). More importantly, in 1997, Reed-
Elsevier acquired Wolters Kluwer, its Dutch rival, itself the 36th largest firm in the
Netherlands (Table 1.10)17. Prior to its own merger with Reed Elsevier in 1997, Wolters
                                                
15. Chemical Week, pp. 26-32, October 27 1993
16. Chemical Week, pp. 33-34, December 21 1994
17.  At the time of writing (December 1997), this acquisition was being scrutinised by the
European commission for possible potential violation of EU competition rules, since the
combined firm would have a monopoly position in several fields such as consumer magazine
publishing and freight-exchange databases (International Herald Tribune, p.11, December 13-
14 1997).
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Kluwer had acquired CCH inc., the US tax and legal publisher for US$ 1.9 billion in 1995.
This is not to say that Dutch outward FDI activity is mature, and primarily dominated
by large MNEs who are engaged in their traditional sectors. Although the Dutch presence in
information technologies has been somewhat subdued with the exit of Philips as an OEM
manufacturer, it is still heavily involved in the production of components, peripherals, and
accessories. Companies such as Tulip have continued to operate profitably in this market, and
companies such as Baan have been making some headway in the software sector.
Elsewhere, there are several smaller manufacturing sector firms which have proved
highly successful by focussing on niche sectors. Firms such as photocopier manufacturer, Océ
-Van der Grinten, which has also been repositioning itself to focus on the engineering market
and very high volume copiers, has been successful in competing with its much larger US and
Japanese competitors. In 1996, it purchased Siemens' printer-making business. Despite its
relatively small size compared to Xerox and Fuji, (with sales of fl 4.1 billion and 17000
employees in 1996, it is less than a tenth the size of Xerox), Océ has the fourth largest R&D
budget amongst Dutch firms, after DSM, Philips, and Shell, and has R&D establishments in
the Netherlands, Germany, France, and the US. It too has been expanding outside its
traditional markets, with the acquisition of sales organisations such as Messerli of
Switzerland in 1997, and has been strengthening its distribution in other European countries.
Europe accounted for 63% of its sales in 1996 and its presence in the US market has also
been growing, with sales in the US increasing from 23% of its total worldwide sales in 1995
to 31% in 1996, with the absolute volume of sales having doubled over that period to fl 1.3
billion.
Another of the great unsung Dutch manufacturing sector success stories has
undoubtedly been Stork, which had net sales of almost fl 5 billion in 1996. Its operations are
divided into two core areas: Industrial systems and components, and Industrial services.
Within these, its operations are divided into several strategic business units: textiles and paper
printing, food processing and packaging, industrial components (which absorbed Fokker
Aviation after its parent’s bankruptcy in 199618), technical services and engineering and
                                                
18. Fokker Aviation is the holding company which controls the profitable divisions of N.V.
Koninklijke Vliegtuigenfabriek Fokker, which had previously been acquired by Daimler
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contracting.
Financial MNEs
The financial sector has perhaps adapted the most, and grown the fastest in terms of
internationalisation in response to these changes. They have done so with a determination and
drive that may easily be mistaken for a crusade, forging alliances, mergers, and acquisitions at
a breathtaking pace. Indeed, Dutch banks were not small by any means, the four largest were
47, 51, 53, and 60 in the Fortune 500 listing of banks in 1989. These same banks are still
present in the 1996 Fortune list (Table 1.10), but have evolved much through mergers,
acquisitions and new investments. To take the instance of ABN-AMRO, which was formed
from a merger of the two largest Dutch banks, Algemene Bank Nederland and Amsterdam-
Rotterdam Bank. These two banks had combined assets of US$ 185 billion in 1989, and by
1995, ABN-AMRO had almost doubled its assets to US$ 340 billion.
                                                                                                                                                       
Benz.
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The other large entity is the ING group which became prominent after its highly publicised
rescue of Barings in 1995. It was created from the merger of NMB Postbank (number 60 in
the Fortune bank rankings of 1989) and Nationale Nederlanden (the largest Dutch insurance
company at the time). The collaboration has been very fruitful, since the new bank has had
access to investment funds from the cash-rich insurance company to develop international
banking operations, and at the same time has been able to expand the international activities
in the insurance sector. ING group had assets of US$ 247 billion in 1995 and revenues of
US$ 33 billion. In 1996, it operated a bank network of over 86 banks in at least 50 countries.
ING and ABN-AMRO have tended to directly compete, both having similar expansion plans.
 Both have an ambition to be a dominant force in emerging markets of Asia and Central and
Eastern Europe, and both are listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This is a relatively
uncommon event amongst European banks. As of August 1997, no German bank was listed,
and amongst British banks, only Barclays19.
There are, nonetheless, considerable differences emerging, in part due to their
different backgrounds. First, ING has been largely frustrated in its attempts to develop the US
market20. This is partly because of the Glass-Steagall Act, which limits the ability of banks to
sell insurance and vice-versa21. ABN-AMRO, on the other hand, does not rely on synergies
between the two sectors, and has invested considerable resources (as well as prior to its
merger), in developing its US market. Depending on the source of statistics, ABN-AMRO is
either the largest (in terms of local assets) or the second largest foreign bank (in terms of
revenues) in the US. It has achieved this position through a series of acquisitions since 1979
(see Figure 1.1).
***Figure 1.1 about here******
Rabobank, although less well-known and considerably smaller than the other two
Dutch banking MNEs, is also a Fortune 500 company. It has had more modest ambitions22,
                                                
19. Financial Times, p.39, May 21 1997.
20. Euromoney,  pp. 65-68, November 1996.
21. Financial World, p.87, February 18 1997.
22. Euromoney, p.68, November 1996.
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planning to be a "global niche player", concentrating on providing service world-wide in its
four core specialist areas: food and agriculture, healthcare, financial institutions, and
international corporates. It has a very much subdued global ambition, given its origins as a
cooperative bank, and subsequently, a more limited access to capital for international
expansion. Indeed, it did not have any overseas offices until the early 1980s. Nonetheless, the
Rabobank too has begun to make its presence felt. It has done so through joint ventures, while
at the same time focussing on these niches. It has a major presence in the Australian
agricultural lending market, for instance, having acquired the Primary Industries Bank (PIBA)
in 199523. It is also active in South and North America in these sectors.
Other Dutch insurance companies have also begun to improve their international
presence. Aegon, for instance, has entered the US market, with the acquisition of US
insurance company Providian for US$ 3.5 billion, making it larger than Nationale
Nederlanden (one of ING’s parents) in terms of assets. Fortis is another insurance firm with
banking ambitions, which is listed on both the Belgian and Dutch stock markets (a result of
its origins: Fortis is a 1990 merger between Groupe AG of Belgium and Fortis AMEV of the
Netherlands). Fortis owns the fifth largest Dutch bank, VSB, which is heavily involved in the
Dutch mortgage market, the fourth largest in Europe. Indeed, it is speculated that VSB would
like to enter the mortgage markets of more European countries when regulations would allow
it24. The purchase of MeesPierson from ABN-Amro in 199625 (another product of the merger
of the investment banking branches of ABN [Mees & Hope] and AMRO [Pierson, Heldring
and Pierson]26), demonstrates the objective of expanding their banking operations.
                                                
23. Business Review Weekly, p.60, January 22 1996.
24. Euroweek, (Structured finance Supplement) p.50, June, 1997.
25. Financial Times, p.13, December  31 1996.
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MeesPierson, whose operations are larger than those of Fortis’ existing banking operations, is
primarily focussed in investment banking.
Non-financial Service MNEs
                                                                                                                                                       
26. The Banker, p.24, April 1996.
Although the Financial MNEs such as ING and ABN-AMRO have received the most
publicity, Dutch MNEs in non-financial services sector have the fastest growing international
operations. Excluding the case of KPN (Koninklijke Post en Telecom), the
telecommunications utility that privatised in 1989, there would seem to be four sectors in
which Dutch service firms are established: employment services, transportation and
distribution services, retail and trading, and environmental services. KPN has sought to
prepare itself for the deregulation of the Dutch telecommunications markets by shedding jobs
and establishing a series of joint ventures and acquisitions to position itself for subsequent
privatisations and deregulations throughout the world. In particular, its small home market
base has meant that it has sought to overcome such limitations by allying itself with other
similarly-challenged firms. KPN has established, in cooperation with Swedish Telia AB,
Swiss Telecom PTT and Telefónica de Espana SA. Unisource has a strategic alliance with
AT&T to establish joint services and standards. Telia and KPN have established a consortium
with Ireland’s Telecom Ierann, while KPN and Swiss Telecom have jointly acquired a 27%
interest in Czech Republic’s SPT Telecom. KPN also has a equity share in PT Telekomsel of
Indonesia and is helping establish GSM services throughout the Indonesian peninsula. It also
acquired TNT, the Australian courier company for fl 2.25 billion in 1996,  adding another
48,000 employees to its payroll.
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The retail sector is best exampled by the case of Ahold, which like SHV27 (which
owns Makro), has expanded outside its home market (where it is the market leader, with a
market  share of 25 percent28 since the 1990s). In fact, by 1996 it owned the fifth largest chain
of US retail stores. Its sales in this market were US$ 12.4 billion in 1995. It has expanded
primarily through acquisitions - its stated goal is to expand its US presence even further
through this means, targeting companies with sales between US$ 1 and 2 billion over the next
few years29. Its expansion plans are not just limited to the North American market, with
expansions also taking place in Spain, Portugal, Poland, Czech Republic, as well as in South
America. It is also developing its Asian presence in Thailand, Malaysia, and China, reportedly
opening stores in China at the rate of one per week in the early 1990s.
Not all retail firms have shown such an aggressive approach to internationalisation.
Vendex International, one of the largest retailers in the Benelux region with sales of 12 billion
in 1996 - its subsidiaries dominate the high street retailers from fashion and groceries to
electronics and sports goods - has limited its overseas expansion to Germany and France.
Indeed, Vendex’s employment services division (Vedior) has been much more aggressive
internationally, and is in fact to be separately listed from Vendex’s retail operations from
199730.
The pioneer in the international employment services sector is Randstad. Randstad is
the 24th largest firms in the Netherlands in terms of sales, with over 320 offices in the
Netherlands. It is also engaged in several other related service sectors including security,
                                                
27. As noted in Table 1.10, SHV is legally domiciled in the Netherlands Antilles.
28. Financial Times, p.30, April 03 1996.
29. Progressive Grocer, pp. 75-79, January 1994.
30. Financial Times, p.20, January 24 1997.
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education, and R&D. More than a third of its net revenues of fl 6 billion in 1996 derived from
its international operations, and this share is expected to grow, given its low penetration in
other markets, particularly with the growing popularity of ‘flexible’ work amongst EU
countries.
In the transportation and distribution sector, Pakhoed has been expanding its position
through acquisitions and joint ventures and is now the second largest distribution firm in
Europe, and the world leader in chemical distribution, with its 1995 acquisition of Lambert
Riviere of France and Univar, the largest North American distributor in that sector. Pakhoed
has clear plans to continue its expansion drive, particularly in Asia. Its main Dutch competitor
Van Ommeren, also has similar plans, and also intends to improve its position on the shipping
side.  Nedlloyd, the transportation conglomerate, is also in the process of rationalising, with
the sale of its oil and gas drilling subsidiary, Neddrill, to Noble Drilling Corp31. In 1996,
Nedlloyd agreed to merge its container operations with those of its main European rival, P&O
of the UK, to create one of the largest container shipping companies in the world32. This is
partly in response to low margins and low returns on capital in the container shipping
industry, with firms trying to cut costs and raise volumes33. It is expected that further mergers
are likely.
Companies such as Heidemij (renamed Arcadis in 1997) have developed a dominant
position in the engineering services sector, but with a particular focus on environment-related
engineering services. Heidemij was originally organised as a public service association, the
Vereniging Nederlandsche Heidemaatschappij, as early as 1888, but was restructured and
established as a limited company in 1982. Since adopting its current operating structure in
1993, it has sold its non-core businesses in software and computing facilities and real estate
agencies.  At the same time, it has aggressively expanded its operations, both in the
Netherlands as well as in Europe, with 51% of its sales coming from outside the Netherlands,
handling projects in over 80 countries. In addition, it has also undertaken a series of
                                                
31. Wall Street Journal, p.B4, 29 April 1996 (eastern edition).
32. Traffic World, p.11, September 16 1996.
33. Financial Times, p.313, April 1997.
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acquisitions to strengthen its worldwide position (see Figure 1.2).
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Table 1.1 Some basic
indicators
Netherlan
ds
Belgium France German
y
Italy UK Switzerlan
d
Canada US Japan
Population 15457 10137 58141 81662 57283 58613 7081 29606 263057 125250
GDP (bln.US$;
PPPs)
305.6 210.8 1159.3 1673.8 1114.7 1041.9 175.7 622.6 6954.8 2736.8
GDP per capita
(PPPs)
19782 21031 19939 20497 19465 17776 24809 21031 26438 21795
Sectoral GDP
     Primary 4.0 1.9 0.5 1.3 3.4 2.2 3.4 3.0 1.9 2.3
     Secondary 31.8 23.8 33.6 41.1 37 34.4 37.4 36.5 28.8 40.6
     Tertiary 64.1 74.2 65.8 57.7 59.6 63.4 59.3 60.6 69.3 57.1
Sectoral labour
     Agriculture 4.0 2.6 5.1 3.3 7.7 2.1 4.0 4.1 2.9 5.8
     Industry 23.0 27.7 27.8 37.6 32.1 27.7 28.8 22.6 24.0 34.0
     Services 73.0 69.7 67.3 59.1 60.2 70.2 67.3 73.3 73.1 60.2
Export (fob) 197087 170230 286762 523000 233868 242692 81499 192502 584742 441512
Export/GDP 49.8 63.2 18.7 21.7 21.5 22.0 26.6 34.4 8.4 8.6
Import (cif) 177912 155449 267059 463472 206246 265696 80193 164443 743445 335392
Import/GDP 45.0 29.4 17.4 19.2 19.0 24.1 26.2 29.4 10.7 6.6
Source: OECD Economic Surveys, various issues
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Table 1.2 Productivity in business sectors
Netherlands N.W. Europea EU OECD
(Annual compound growth rates)
Real GDP per capita 1960-73 3.57 3.63 4.25 3.94
1973-87 1.21 1.83 1.81 1.84
1987-94 1.83 1.13 1.52 1.32
1960-94 2.24 2.37 2.67 2.53
GDP per hour worked 1960-73 5.25 4.89 5.59 4.84
1973-87 2.60 2.41 2.51 2.31
1987-94 1.49 2.05 2.31 2.13
1960-94 3.37 3.25 3.64 3.23
(as % of the Netherlands)
GDP per capita 1960-73 100 100 79 86
1973-87 100 100 86 90
1987-94 100 109 93 98
1960-94 100 104 91 94
GDP per hour worked 1960-73 100 91 74 86
1973-87 100 87 77 82
1987-94 100 85 77 79
1960-94 100 88 81 82
Source: OECD Economic Surveys 1995-1996, the Netherlands
a. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom.
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Table 1.3 Geographical destination of Dutch
exports
1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
EU 71.3 72.2 74.0 72.0 70.7
EFTA 6.4 6.9 5.8 5.7 2.3
USA 2.8 2.5 5.2 3.6 3.7
Africa 4.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.6
Asia 5.9 6.6 6.2 5.0 6.0
Other
countries
9.6 7.8 5.8 11.7 15.7
100 100 100 100 100
Source: UN International Trade Statistics
32
Table 1.4 Product composition of Dutch exports (share
of product group)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
1 Agriculture 9.5 7.7 7.2 8.3 8.5
2 Mining quarry 6.1 8.8 9.0 3.4 3.0
3 Manufacturing 84.4 83.5 83.3 88.3 88.5
    31 Food beverages and
tobacco
15.8 14.9 15.3 15.6 16.4
    32 Textiles 6.1 4.7 4.3 4.4 4.2
    33 Wood & products 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.6
    34 Paper & products 2.2 2.2 2.3 3.1 2.9
    35 Chemicals 28.1 30.9 33.4 24.5 22.7
    36 Nonmetal products 1.0 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.0
    37 Basic metals 5.3 5.5 4.2 4.2 3.8
    38 Metal manufacturing 24.8 22.3 22.0 30.2 31.8
    39 Other manufacturing 0.9 1.8 0.5 4.7 5.1
100.1 100.1 99.3 100 100
Source: UN International Trade Statistics
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Table 1.5 Investment position of the Netherlands in comparison with other countries
1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
Netherlands
FDI stock (US$ mln.) 19922 42116 47772 109124 146035
Share global FDI stock 7.10% 8.20% 7.00% 6.50% 6.10%
FDI stock per capita (US$ 1,000) 1.46 2.98 3.30 7.30 9.49
FDIstock/GDP 0.245 0.245 0.382 0.391 0.437
FDIstock/EXP 0.570 0.570 0.700 0.828 0.942
France
FDI stock (US$ mln.) 10608 23604 37077 110126 183406
Share global FDI stock 3.80% 4.60% 5.50% 6.60% 7.70%
FDI stock per capita (US$ 1,000) 0.20 0.44 0.67 1.95 3.16
FDIstock/GDP 0.032 0.036 0.073 0.092 0.138
FDIstockEXP 0.206 0.213 0.381 0.509 0.779
Germany
FDI stock (US$ mln.) 14354 43127 59909 151581 205608
Share global FDI stock 5.10% 8.40% 8.80% 9.10% 8.60%
FDI stock per capita (US$ 1,000) 0.23 0.70 0.98 2.40 2.53
FDIstock/GDP 0.034 0.053 0.096 0.102 0.112
FDIstock/EXP 0.159 0.225 0.327 0.370 0.487
Italy
FDI stock (US$ mln.) 3299 7319 16301 56102 83462
Share global FDI stock 1.20% 1.40% 2.40% 3.40% 3.50%
FDI stock per capita (US$ 1,000) 0.06 0.13 0.29 0.97 1.46
FDIstock/GDP 0.019 0.016 0.045 0.051 0.082
FDIstock/EXP 0.095 0.094 0.206 0.329 0.440
UK
FDI stock (US$ mln.) 37002 80434 100313 230825 281170
Share global FDI stock 13.20% 15.60% 14.80% 13.80% 11.80%
FDI stock per capita (US$ 1,000) 0.66 1.43 1.77 4.02 4.82
FDIstock/GDP 0.162 0.150 0.223 0.241 0.276
FDIstock/EXP 0.846 0.703 0.991 1.243 1.370
Switzerland
FDI stock (US$ mln.) 22443 21491 21350 65731 95328
Share global FDI stock 8.00% 4.20% 3.10% 3.90% 4.00%
FDI stock per capita (US$ 1,000) 3.50 3.40 3.30 9.67 13.63
34
FDIstock/GDP 0.414 0.211 0.230 0.292 0.370
FDIstock/EXP 1.733 0.729 0.783 1.030 1.353
Canada
FDI stock (US$ mln.) 10356 22572 40947 78853 105606
Share global FDIs 3.70% 4.40% 6.00% 4.70% 4.40%
FDI stock per capita (US$ 1,000) 0.46 0.94 1.63 2.96 3.61
FDIstock/GDP 0.065 0.086 0.118 0.138 0.194
FDIstock/EXP 0.321 0.358 0.476 0.619 0.639
US
FDI stock (US$ mln.) 124050 220178 251034 435219 610061
Share global FDI stock 44.30% 42.80% 36.90% 26.10% 25.70%
FDI stock per capita (US$ 1,000) 0.58 0.97 1.05 1.73 2.34
FDIstock/GDP 0.082 0.081 0.064 0.081 0.092
FDIstock/EXP 1.169 1.034 1.223 1.105 1.190
Japan
FDI stock (US$ mln.) 15941 19610 43970 201440 277733
Share global FDI stock 5.70% 3.80% 6.50% 12.10% 11.70%
FDI stock per capita (US$ 1,000) 0.14 0.17 0.36 1.63 2.22
FDIstock/GDP 0.032 0.019 0.033 0.069 0.061
FDIstock/EXP 0.286 0.151 0.250 0.701 0.701
Global FDI stock 280136 514224 679393 1667579 2378025
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics; IRM Directory; UNCTAD (1995); OECD Economic Survey (various issues)
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Table 1.6 Geographical division of Dutch FDI stock in the world (Millions of guilders and share in total)
1973 % 1975 % 1980 % 1985 % 1990 % 1995 %
EU 22335 50.6 28006 52.3 42965 47.9 43493 32.8 83719 45.7 139078 49.2
          Austria 2363 0.8
          Belgium-Luxembourg 3132 7.1 4139 7.7 6345 7.1 10060 7.6 21382 11.7 37675 13.3
          Denmark 345 0.8 551 1.0 813 0.9 626 0.5 1348 0.7 3206 1.1
          Germany 8324 18.8 8807 16.4 9806 10.9 12422 9.4 17479 9.5 22115 7.8
          Finland 0.0 510 0.2
          France 2815 6.4 3570 6.7 6169 6.9 7188 5.4 14188 7.7 18568 6.6
          Ireland 120 0.3 120 0.2 508 0.6 805 0.6 1046 0.6 5047 1.8
          Italy 803 1.8 720 1.3 1322 1.5 1797 1.4 2705 1.5 3861 1.4
          Spain 2513 1.9 5632 3.1 9044 3.2
          Sweden 3337 1.2
          United Kingdom 6796 15.4 10099 18.9 18002 20.1 7620 5.7 18846 10.3 31182 11.0
          Other EU 462 0.3 1093 0.6 2170 0.8
Other Europe 9704 7.3 15885 8.7 23907 8.5
          Switzerland 1025 2.3 1568 2.9 4216 4.7 7619 5.7 12847 7.0 18964 6.7
          Central and Eastern Europe 5 0.0 23 0.0 2729 1.0
USA 6200 14.0 7126 13.3 16864 18.8 54343 41.0 53666 29.3 69759 24.7
Latin America and the Caribbean 5278 11.9 6079 11.3 10145 11.3 10180 7.7 12020 6.6 18232 6.5
          Netherlands Antilles (1) 2575 5.8 3804 7.1 6399 7.1 6557 4.9 7547 4.1 8420 3.0
Africa 201 0.5 601 1.1 843 0.9 2249 1.7 1839 1.0 3244 1.1
Japan 1270 1.0 1677 0.9 2351 0.8
Other countries 9134 20.7 10181 19.0 14652 16.3 11292 8.5 14316 7.8 26058 9.2
          Southeast Asia (2) 1738 3.9 1923 3.6 3991 4.5 3971 3.0 5439 3.0 13971 4.9
TOTAL 44173 100.0 53561 100.0 89685 100.0 132531 100.0 183122 100.0 282630 100.0
Source: De Nederlandsche Bank
1) Including Aruba
2) Including all developing countries within Asia
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Table 1.7 Sectoral division of Dutch outward FDI Stock (Millions of guilders and share of total)
1973 % 1975 % 1980 % 1985 % 1990 % 1995 %
PRIMARY 127 0.3 137 0.3 439 0.5 125 0.1 193 0.1 176 0.1
 Agriculture 127 0.3 137 0.3 439 0.5 125 0.1 193 0.1 176 0.1
 Mining and quarrying .. .. ..
 Oil .. .. ..
SECONDARY 38215 86.5 45577 85.1 72203 80.5 87925 66.3 103948 56.8 143938 50.9
 Food, beverages and tobacco 5863 13.3 6063 11.3 7103 7.9 11128 8.4 16326 8.9 27127 9.6
 Textiles, leather and clothing .. .. ..
 Paper, printing and publishing .. .. ..
 Chemical products (1) 20914 47.3 24918 46.5 45794 51.1 56486 42.6 59753 32.6 74796 26.5
 Coal and petroleum products .. .. ..
 Non-metallic products .. .. ..
 Metal products (2) 10634 24.1 13544 25.3 17394 19.4 18447 13.9 21855 11.9 28444 10.1
 Mechanical equipment .. .. ..
 Electric and electronic equipment .. .. ..
 Motor vehicles .. .. ..
 Other transport equipment .. .. ..
 Other manufacturing 804 1.8 1052 2.0 1912 2.1 1864 1.4 6014 3.3 13571 4.8
TERTIARY 5831 13.2 7847 14.7 17043 19.0 44481 33.6 78981 43.1 138515 49.0
 Construction 495 1.1 837 1.6 1189 1.3 1068 0.8 594 0.3 1986 0.7
 Wholesale and retail trade 2365 5.4 2890 5.4 6549 7.3 5489 4.1 12786 7.0 29587 10.5
 Transport and storage (3) 1312 3.0 1658 3.1 1491 1.7 1591 1.2 2701 1.5 4743 1.7
 Finance, insurance and business serv. (4) 1659 3.8 2462 4.6 7814 8.7 36333 27.4 62900 34.3 102199 36.2
 Communication .. .. ..
 Other services (5) .. .. ..
UNALLOCATED .. .. ..
TOTAL 44173 100.0 53561 100.0 89685 100.0 132531 100.0 183122 100.0 282629 100.0
Source: De Nederlandsche Bank.
1. Up to 1992, including mining and quarrying, oil and chemicals.
2. Up to 1992, including metal and electrical engineering.
3. Up to 1992, including transport, storage and communication.
4. Up to 1992, including other services. As from 1993, including real estate activities.
5. Including electricity, gas, water, hotels, restaurants and other services.
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Table 1.8 Dutch Outward FDI stock by country and sector, 1995 (millions of guilders)
Industry Services
Agriculture Minerals, Metals Food, Banking
and oils and and Beverages and Transpor- and Construc-
Country Fishery chemicals Electronics Tobacco Other Total Trade tation Insurance Other Total tion Total
European Union 160 26070 11950 11237 9843 59099 16717 2077 24292 35405 78491 1328 139078
       Austria 1 400 889 328 323 1939 12 11 86 314 423 0 2363
       Belgium and Luxembourg 11 5951 2785 2297 6597 17629 3992 468 7113 7866 19440 596 37675
       Denmark 11 1142 191 153 3 1490 203 8 445 1062 1717 -11 3026
       Germany 107 3970 2070 1729 586 8355 3235 545 5193 4432 13406 248 22115
       Finland 0 302 59 52 0 413 55 0 0 37 92 4 510
       France 19 1871 2249 2341 792 7252 1930 348 3517 5499 11294 3 18568
       Ireland 0 464 206 519 159 1347 857 9 903 1913 3682 18 5047
       Italy -3 1135 350 1078 0 2563 792 37 60 411 1300 2 3861
       Spain 3 1781 287 1138 -34 3173 1321 12 903 3629 5865 3 9044
       Sweden 0 1581 316 170 -329 1739 272 296 283 747 1598 0 3337
       UK 10 7284 2442 650 1650 12025 3768 339 5437 9137 18682 465 31182
       Other 2 188 107 782 97 1174 280 3 351 358 993 1 2170
Other Europe 1 3192 2817 6125 1130 13264 2298 455 1935 5860 10548 93 23907
       Switzerland 0 2858 2425 4761 1097 11141 1702 344 1362 4398 7807 17 18964
       Eastern Europe 1) 1 215 187 882 23 1308 505 36 537 341 1419 0 2729
United States 9 27136 7446 2934 1474 38990 2892 1316 15490 10882 30580 180 69759
Latin America 7 4757 1333 4255 549 10894 3857 413 2140 714 7125 207 18232
       Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 5 871 161 2259 550 3842 2496 376 1354 148 4374 199 8420
Africa 0 2125 227 183 66 2601 152 115 33 255 556 87 3244
Japan 0 1021 758 261 35 2074 78 -66 239 26 277 0 2351
Other 0 10497 3914 2132 474 17017 3592 432 3839 1088 8951 90 26058
       South-east Asia 2) 0 3975 3277 1640 288 9179 2834 394 1164 376 4768 24 13971
Total Outward FDI StockDutch
Investments
176 74796 28444 27127 13571 143939 29587 4743 47969 54230 136528 1986 282630
Source: De Nederlandsche Bank
1) Eastern Europe consists of Albania, Czeck Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia, the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia
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2) South East Asia consists of China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand.
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Table 1.9 Profile of large MNEs from some small industrialised
countries
Fortune list
Number
of
Number
of
1995 revenues Largest firm of given nationality
firms in industries Average Standard in fortune list
fortune
list
represente
d
deviation Name Revenues Fortune
rank
Netherlan
ds
11 9 30753 27659 Royal Dutch
Shell
* 109833 10
Belgium 6 6 13143 4841 Fortis ** 22695 135
Australia 4 4 11331 2411 Broken Hill 13745 284
Finland 2 2 9578 616 Neste 10014 439
Norway 2 2 13113 756 Statoil 13648 287
Sweden 3 3 18067 5278 Volvo 24021 123
Switzerlan
d
16 9 21571 13591 Metroholdings 56459 28
Canada 6 5 11070 3447 BCE 17939 191
Largest purely Dutch MNE Philips 40148 53
Largest purely Belgian  MNE Belhaize' de
lion'
12681 319
* Dutch/British ownership
**Belgian/Dutch ownership
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TABLE 1.10 Some of the most significant Dutch MNEs, by industrial sector.
Dutch 1996
Ranking5 by Revenues Rank in Fortune list
Name Industry 1995 revenues# (mln guilders) 1995 1989
Manufacturing MNEs
Royal Dutch Shell2 Petroleum & refining 1 215753 10 4
Unilever2 Food and personal products 2 87795 38 18
Philips Electronics & electrical equipment 3 69195 53 29
Akzo Nobel3 Chemicals 8 22438 300 142
KNP BT Paper and packaging 12 13637
Heineken Beverages 15 12189 403
DSM Chemicals 16 10263 266
Reed-Elsevier2,4 Printing and publishing 19 8901 460
Polygram Music and entertaiment 20 9488
Hoogovens Steel 21 7933 307
Stork Machinery and eng. services 30 4916
Wolters Kluwer Printing and publishing 28 4315
Van Leer packaging 32 4179
Oce-van der Grinten Photocopiers and printers 39 4174
CSM Food products 40 3026
Gist Brocades Biotechnology/ food additives 47 2020
Tulip Computers 94 532 *
Baan Software 109 348 *
Non-financial service MNEs
Ahold Retail 6 36538 185
SHV Retail 7 29963 230
KPN Telecommunications 10 20505 345
Vendex International Retail 14 12145
KLM Air transport 17 10358
Nedlloyd Sea transport 22 6831
Pakhoed Storage/transportation 45 3594
Randstad Employment 26 5953
Heidemij (Arcadis) Environmental engineering 71 1066
Van Ommeron Storage/transportation 72 880 *
Financial MNEs
ING Insurance/banking 4 47551 72
FORTIS1 Insurance/banking 5 40774 135
AEGON Insurance/banking 9 24487 307
ABN-AMRO Banking 11 19091 105
RABOBANK Banking 18 9647 297
Sources: Revenues based on estimates from Het Financieel Dagblad: de omzetcijfers van 1996;
Jaarboek van Nederlandse ondernemingen 1995/96, Uitgeverij Tutein Nolthenius, 9th edition, and annual reports.
Fortune rankings from Fortune August 5, 1995, and July 30, 1990.
# Dutch rankings based on Jaarboek van Nederlandse ondernemingen 1995/96, Uitgeverij Tutein Nolthenius, 9th
edition. Adjusted for SHV (legally domiciled in the Netherlands Antilles, position 7) and Rabobank (not listed on
the stock exchange, at position 18). This has moved all other companies down one or two positions.
1) Fortis is of joint Belgian and Netherlands nationality. 1996 revenues exclude MeesPierson.
2) Reed-Elsevier, Shell and Unilever are of joint British and Dutch ownership.
3) 1989 Fortune ranking for Akzo Nobel  for Akzo only.
4) 1989 Fortune ranking for Reed -Elsevier for Reed only.
5) Dutch ranking list includes foreign-owned affiliates in the Netherlands.
* 1995 figures
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